

March 2026

A CASE FOR COLLATERALISED LOAN OBLIGATIONS (CLOs)



YOUR BRIGHT
FUTURE

OUR INVESTMENT
EXPERTISE




KEY TAKEAWAYS

- ▶ The higher yield and defensive income profile of floating rate investments such as CLOs has attracted asset allocators looking to improve portfolio diversification.
- ▶ Relative value favours AAA and BBB CLOs, which can offer enhanced spread and yield compared to investment grade (IG) and high yield (HY) corporate credit respectively. History shows that IG CLOs also deliver better returns over the long term versus other traditional fixed income.
- ▶ The diversity within the market and European regulatory environment necessitate an active approach to investing in CLOs, which can fully evaluate the risk and return potential of each distinct deal and capture relative value to optimise returns.

What are CLOs?

A collateralised loan obligation (CLO) – a portfolio of corporate (leveraged) loans rated below investment grade that have been securitised – can be thought of as analogous to a mini bank (as an aggregator of loans). These are broadly syndicated loans to large companies, which typically have enterprise valuations in excess of €1 billion and often many multiples of this.

Figure 1: CLO structure and credit enhancement



Source: Janus Henderson Investors. For illustrative purposes only. Credit enhancement: Used in securitisation to improve the credit quality and ratings of the debt tranches. The percentages shown include a small amount of excess spread. Excess spread is the net income earned on the loan portfolio after payment of securitised debt interest and operational expenses.

The first CLO was issued in the 1990s and specialist CLO managers – of which there are over 70 in Europe and over 150 in the US¹ – have built up their experience and expertise in this market. They select a portfolio of corporate loans and hold them in a special purpose vehicle (SPV). This SPV issues different tranches of debt, which are ranked in priority and therefore credit quality based on the order of their claim to interest and principal cashflows from the loan pool.

Should a loan default, any losses are allocated from the bottom of the CLO structure, starting with the equity. Each subsequent tranche provides protection against portfolio losses to more senior notes. The first line of defence, however, is the net income earned on the loan portfolio after payment of securitised debt interest and operational expenses. This “excess spread” is redirected from the equity holders if needed to help offset portfolio losses. Typically, portfolio losses need to be above 40% before the most senior bonds rated AAA start to be impacted. While the type of security and recovery following default can vary, history shows that average recoveries have typically been more than 60%². While illustrative, this shows the inherent structural protections against loss within IG CLOs, where the loans are also secured against the collateral.

The CLO market accessible to European investors has been steadily growing over time and is now nearly US\$550 billion³. Nevertheless, CLOs are missing from most major indices and many investors have little CLO exposure. Higher-rated CLOs are primarily held by large institutional investors looking for yield enhancement, such as bank treasuries, asset managers, pensions and endowments, hedge funds, family offices and insurance companies. European CLOs are usually quoted as spread over EURIBOR while US CLOs are usually linked to SOFR and are typically floating rate, where the interest rate is adjusted periodically according to this underlying benchmark rate.

Two sides of the same coin – high yield and loans

The companies that finance themselves through loans are generally no different from those companies that finance themselves through HY bonds. Indeed, in many instances individual companies will have issued both HY bonds and loans. CLOs are a very important institutional funding source for corporates – with the European CLO market sized at around 60% of the loans market, as represented by the European leveraged loan index (Figure 2). Similarly, the European CLO market is around 60% of the size of the European HY market (Figure 3). The importance of the CLO market has grown over recent years in Europe and the US, both in terms of the proportion of the loan market it helps to finance and its scale relative to the HY market.

Figure 2: CLO market as proportion of loans market





Figure 3: CLO market as proportion of HY market



Source: Janus Henderson Investors, BofA Securities CLO Factbook, as at 10 November 2023. For illustrative purposes only.

¹ Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Bloomberg, Intex Calc and JPMorgan Indices, as at 31 December 2025.

² Source: UBS, as at 31 December 2024.

³ Source: Janus Henderson Investors, as at 31 December 2025.

Why CLOs now?

The income return from a CLO is made up of a credit spread and an underlying cash rate based on EURIBOR/SOFR, for example. This income will therefore go up and down with moves in the cash rate. There remain macro and political factors that make the future path of rates highly uncertain while economies globally are diverging in their rate cycles. Against this backdrop, investing in floating rate instruments can be advantageous, providing attractive income carry opportunities whilst being largely immunised from interest rate volatility.

Moreover, when interest rates decrease, the spread component of floating rate credit instruments becomes a more significant factor in their overall yield. This often attracts more investment into CLOs as investors seek to maintain their portfolio's income levels. Moving into IG CLOs and earning an attractive credit spread can help sustain income levels should cash rates decline, while offering additional spread-based income if cash rates increase.

In our view, IG CLOs enable investors to capture attractive income without taking meaningful idiosyncratic risk. They also bring portfolio diversification benefits (Figure 4) due to their floating rate nature and diversification of loans within a CLO – which holds around 100-300 underlying loans – curated by a CLO manager. A CLO strategy also adds diversification at the portfolio level across many CLO deals and managers. In summary, there are three key benefits from a yield and risk perspective (Figure 5).

Figure 4: CLOs offer diversification benefits – with low correlations to traditional asset classes

	AAA CLO	BBB CLO	US Equities	US Aggregate	US Treasury	US High Yield	Bank Loans	US Investment Grade	Agency MBS	ABS	CMBS
AAA CLO	1.00										
BBB CLO	0.61	1.00									
US Equities	0.17	0.20	1.00								
US Aggregate	0.06	0.00	0.00	1.00							
US Treasury	-0.01	-0.06	-0.15	0.97	1.00						
US High Yield	0.39	0.30	0.56	0.27	0.08	1.00					
Bank Loans	0.59	0.40	0.42	0.04	-0.11	0.72	1.00				
US Investment Grade	0.19	0.08	0.12	0.94	0.87	0.46	0.27	1.00			
Agency MBS	0.00	-0.02	0.09	0.92	0.84	0.27	0.00	0.80	1.00		
ABS	0.12	0.09	-0.10	0.82	0.80	0.17	0.07	0.72	0.78	1.00	
CMBS	0.20	0.15	-0.07	0.90	0.88	0.22	0.10	0.83	0.81	0.90	1.00

Source: Bloomberg, JP Morgan, as of 31 December 2025. Notes: Daily correlations for the 10-year period ending 31 December, 2025. Indices used to represent asset classes: AAA CLOs (J.P. Morgan CLO AAA Index), BBB CLOs (J.P. Morgan CLO BBB Index), US Equities (S&P 500 Index), US Aggregate (Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index), US Treasury (Bloomberg US Treasury Index), US High Yield (Bloomberg US Corporate High Yield Index), Bank Loans (Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loans Index), US Corporate (Bloomberg US Corporate Index), Agency MBS (Bloomberg US MBS Index), ABS (Bloomberg US Agg ABS Index), CMBS (Bloomberg US CMBS Investment Grade Index). ABS = Asset-backed Securities; Agency MBS = Agency Mortgage-backed Securities; CMBS = Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities.

Figure 5: Key considerations when seeking yield while attempting to mitigate risk



Why CLOs?

In our view, AAA CLOs and BBB CLOs offer compelling relative value versus IG and HY credit respectively, with investors able to access better yield and credit quality, as well as negligible sensitivity to interest rate changes. To achieve a similar level of credit spread and yield available in AAA CLOs, investors typically would need to move down the credit spectrum into BBB-rated corporate credits (Figure 6). Similarly, the spread and yield available in BBB CLOs is slightly higher than HY corporates, which have a lower average credit quality of B+.

Figure 6: Relative value favours IG CLOs

	AAA CLO	BBB CLO	IG Corp	BBB Corp	HY Corp
Credit Spread (bps) ¹	130	329	114	135	301
Total Yield (USD) (%) ²	5.0	6.9	4.8	5.1	6.6
Spread Duration (years) ³	4.6	7.6	6.4	6.3	2.8
Interest Rate Duration (years) ⁴	0.2	0.2	6.6	6.4	2.9
Average rating	AAA	BBB	A-	BBB	B+


Source: Janus Henderson Investors, ICE indices, JP Morgan. Showing US CLO and corporate credit indices, as at 31 December 2025. ¹ For CLO, based on Discount Margin; for corporate credit, Swap OAS. ² All yields are published yields from index providers. Yield-to-maturity for CLOs and yield-to-worst for corporate credit. ³ For CLO, based on average life estimates and spread duration for credit indices. Spread duration is a measure of how much a bond's price changes in response to a change in its credit spread. ⁴ Credit indices based on effective duration. For CLO, based on estimates. **Yields may vary and are not guaranteed.** The above are the Team's views and should not be construed as advice and may not reflect other opinions in the organisation.

Structural protection and defaults

There has never been a default of a A, AA, or AAA-rated CLO in Europe, even during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Figure 8 overleaf). Figure 7 helps to illustrate why this has been the case. It shows the various debt tranches in a European CLO overlaid with historic rolling sub-IG default rates and estimated cumulative losses (assuming a 60% recovery rate on defaulted loans). The cumulative loss line peaks at nearly 16%, materially below the level needed to impact the value of a typical A-rated tranche. With 40% credit enhancement to a typical AAA CLO, this would also imply losses of more than two and a half times the GFC peak level are needed to start to incur a potential loss on a AAA-rated bond.

Even in environments of high default rates, structural protections in CLOs, such as capturing excess spread to absorb the impact of portfolio loan losses and covenants (or triggers) that control principal cashflows, have helped to materially reduce losses to BBB and BB-rated tranches. Factoring in more conservative assumptions – a 55% recovery rate on defaulted loans – cumulative defaults would need to reach around 33%⁴ before a BBB tranche incurs its first unit of principal loss (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Historical cumulative loan losses vs CLO tranche protection



Source: Moody's Investors Services, Credit Suisse/UBS, as at 31 December 2024. Note: * For illustrative purposes only. Cumulative loss rate was calculated based on cumulative defaults and 60% recovery rate. Breakeven cumulative defaults – The cumulative defaults structure need to experience so that CLO tranches incur a first of €1 euro of principal loss without accounting for excess spread and by assuming a more conservative 55% recovery rate on defaulted loans. **Past performance does not predict future returns.**

⁴ This conservative calculation excludes the mitigating impact of excess spread.

Figure 8 provides longer-term impairment (or default loss) rates for CLOs, which evidence how negligible default risk is, especially when considered against comparable corporate credit. This is testament to CLOs' in-built resilience.

Figure 8: Default rate by original rating

Tranche	Euro CLOs	US CLOs	Euro corporate*	US corporate*
AAA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
AA	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	1.0%
A	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	1.6%
BBB	0.4%	0.2%	1.4%	3.8%

	Euro BBB CLOs	US BBB CLOs	Euro Corporates (Sub-IG)	US Corporates (Sub-IG)
Long-term cumulative default rate	0.4%	0.2%	14.7%	22.1%


Source: S&P Global as at 31 December 2024. CLO default rates reflect 2001-2024 for European, and 1996-2024 for US. *Euro and US corporates reflect the average default rate for a 10-year holding period. Notes: **Past performance does not predict future returns.** For illustrative purposes only.

Performance in drawdowns: Similar or lower mark-to-market risk compared to corporates

The mark-to-market risk of CLOs compared to other asset classes can be evaluated by looking at their performance during volatile markets. Figures 9 and 10 look at the length and depth of drawdowns during these periods. The orange or black bars mark the drawdown point from the previous high watermark. When these bars disappear (reach zero), it marks when the asset class has retraced returns to that high watermark. This again highlights the resilience of AAA CLOs, showing minimal drawdowns during the 2018 rate event and a swift recovery post-COVID, against a slightly more prolonged recovery of IG credit. During 2022, the drawdown of AAA and BBB CLOs was shallower and recovery quicker, partly due to its floating rate nature, unlike the more severe and lasting impacts on IG and HY, which has more rates duration. During the 2025 tariff-induced volatility, BBB CLOs also saw a shallower drawdown and AAA CLOs experienced little performance impact compared to HY and IG respectively.

Shallow and brief drawdowns in IG CLOs relative to traditional corporate credit

Figure 9: European AAA CLOs versus European IG




Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Bloomberg, JP Morgan as at 31 December 2025.

Note: Chart showing cumulative drawdowns. AAA CLO: JP Morgan European AAA CLOIE index. European IG: ICE BofA Euro Corporate Bond Index. Drawdown returns from 31 December 2017 to 31 December 2025.

Past performance does not predict future returns.

Figure 10: US BBB CLOs versus US HY



Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Bloomberg, JP Morgan as at 31 December 2025.


Note: Chart showing cumulative drawdowns. US BBB CLO: J.P. Morgan Collateralized Loan Obligation BBB Index. US HY: ICE BofA US Corporate Index. Drawdown returns from 30 December 2011 to 31 December 2025. **Past performance does not predict future returns.**

Liquidity holds up during market volatility

The GFC created a stigma around securitised debt generally, tarnishing it as 'risky' and 'illiquid'. Some have viewed CLOs through this lens, however, a deeper dive into historical defaults and performance during volatile markets and quick recoveries challenges this view. As an active investor in CLOs for more than 16 years, experience tells us that liquidity is also far better than many might perceive.

The 2022 Liability-Driven Investment (LDI) crisis⁵ underscored this, when about €3.3 billion of European AAA CLOs⁶ traded over a short time horizon. The real liquidity test, however, is the ability to raise funds efficiently without excessive costs. In October 2022, at the height of the LDI crisis, the average liquidity cost for AAA CLOs – the difference between the bid and offer on a specific bond or the bid-ask spread – did spike, against a backdrop of an average cash price of 95 (Figure 11), compared to European IG corporate credit trading in the 80s⁷. So whilst both bid-ask spreads and prices felt the impact of absorbing these volumes, markets remained functional with rational pricing observed and market conditions quickly normalised after this (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Active CLO market during market volatility with rapid normalisation of cost of liquidity



Source: MSCI, JP Morgan, Janus Henderson, as at 31 August 2025.

Note: **There is no guarantee past trends will continue.**

⁵ This crisis affected UK defined benefit pension schemes, which had to quickly sell assets to meet margin calls after the government "mini-budget" announcement caused a sharp increase in gilt yields.


⁶ Source: Janus Henderson Investors and European CLO dealers, November 2023. Period covered 1 September 2022 to 30 November 2022.

⁷ Source: Bloomberg, as at 31 October 2022. Euro IG = ICE BofA Corporate Index.

Enhancing long-term returns from IG CLOs

Looking over a longer timeframe, AAA CLOs demonstrate superior risk-adjusted returns with lower volatility compared to traditional fixed income such as IG corporate bonds and the US Aggregate Index, as illustrated in Figure 12. Despite higher volatility, BBB CLOs offer superior long-term returns versus high yield and loans (Figures 12 & 13), in large part due to a lower historic default experience. Drawdowns have historically been temporary and not ultimately detracted from long-term returns. For those looking to build diversified fixed income portfolios, in our view CLOs present an efficient alternative, enhancing income while adding diversification. As a manager of broadly diversified fixed income portfolios, CLOs have played a key role in our multi-sector credit solutions for a number of years.

Figure 12: 10-year returns for IG CLOs stack up well relative to traditional fixed income



Source: Bloomberg, JP Morgan, Morningstar, as at 31 December 2025.

Indices used to represent asset classes: Leveraged Loans: (Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan 100), High Yield (Bloomberg US Corporate High Yield Index), AAA CLOs (JP Morgan CLOIE AAA Index), BBB CLOs (JP Morgan CLO BBB Index), Investment Grade (iBoxx Liquid Investment Grade Index), Money Market (S&P US Treasury Bill 0-3 Month Index), US Agg (Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index), US Agg Float adj (Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond – Float adjusted Index), 1-5 Yr Gov/Cr. (Bloomberg 1-5 Year US Gov/Credit Index), Short-term Treasury (Bloomberg Short-Term Treasury Index), Floating Rate Note (Bloomberg US Floating Rate Notes <5yr), MBS (Bloomberg US Aggregate Securitized – MBS).

Past performance does not predict future returns.


Why active?

Investing in CLOs leads inevitably to active management given the European regulatory environment and diversity within the sector. With over 70 CLO managers in Europe and over 150 in the US across hundreds of deals, each one presents unique idiosyncratic risks and characteristics, driven by differences in collateral, management, and structure. This necessitates a focused approach to security selection, understanding each manager's strategy and the specific risks of their CLOs.

While an active approach focuses on security selection, passive investment strategies, which do not distinguish between individual CLO structures, can lead to portfolios that may not align with an investor's risk preferences, return expectations or desired collateral quality. This is particularly important during weaker macro environments and market dislocations. Active management involves understanding the risks and opportunities within different tranches of CLOs. Collateral quality can drive credit risk in junior tranches and increased market risk in senior tranches during market dislocations. In benign markets, price variation often isn't visible in AAA CLOs, but it is in more junior tranches. However, during volatility, dispersion can even emerge between AAA CLOs. Being aware of this is crucial to the management of CLO portfolios.

Market convention categorises managers into "tiers" based on experience, underwriting discipline, risk management and historical performance through stress scenarios. A clear understanding of CLO manager "tiering", or variation in collateral quality and quality of CLO management, is therefore key to managing risk. At Janus Henderson, we take a more conservative view on risk. This translates to consistency across our CLO strategies, with a common bias toward better-quality deals and managers, which tend to have lower exposure to weaker credits. These attributes can enhance performance resilience during volatility. An active approach also adds value in other ways such as identifying the best part of spread curves to invest in or assessing the impact of early call on a bond's return.

Figure 13: BBB CLOs outperform HY and loans due to reduced idiosyncratic risk



Source: Janus Henderson Investors, JPMorgan, ICE, S&P UBS as at 30 September 2025. Cumulative performance based at 100 (December 2011 – October 2025)

Note: Indices used: JP Morgan BBB CLO Index, ICE BofA US Corporate High Yield Index, JP Morgan Leveraged Loan Index.


Past performance does not predict future returns.

Active management becomes especially critical in Europe, where regulatory requirements mandate thorough due diligence on CLO managers and their strategies. This regulatory environment compels European investors to actively select CLOs globally based on an in-depth understanding of the collateral risks and management quality, differentiating between deals to construct a portfolio that aligns with investment goals and risk tolerance.

We also believe that assessment of ESG risks is now an integral part of credit investing that requires both quantitative and qualitative expertise that is deployed through an active approach.

Figure 14: Results of adding 10%, 20% and 30% AAA CLO allocation to your fixed income portfolio

For active fixed income investors, adding CLOs can create a cornerstone of investment portfolios with different risk and return drivers. This is what our Portfolio Construction & Strategy Team have analysed by looking at the asset class make-up of a typical European client fixed income portfolio and how adding 10%, 20%, 30% of AAA CLOs improves the portfolio's risk-return dynamics.



Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Bloomberg, Morningstar, JP Morgan, as at 31 January 2026. Indices used as representative in hypothetical portfolios: Euro AAA CLOs – JPM EUR CLO AAA TR Simulated; Global Bonds – Bloomberg Global Aggregate TR Hdg EUR; Euro IG – ICE BofA Euro Corporate TR EUR; Euro Govt – ICE BofA Euro Government TR EUR; Euro HY – ICE BofA Euro High Yield TR EUR; Global HY – Bloomberg Global High Yield TR EUR; EM Debt – Bloomberg EM Hard Currency Agg TR EUR; Bank Loans – S&P UBS Western European Leveraged Loan TR EUR; US Bonds – Bloomberg US Agg Bond TR EUR; Convertibles – Refinitiv Europe CB TR EUR; Cash – ICE BofA EUR Ccy 3M Dep BdRt CM TR EUR (Cash). Average client portfolio is based on the average of Janus Henderson European clients' fixed income portfolios. Portfolios are hypothetical and performance is based on historic index returns. Investors should not assume they will have a similar investment experience. **Past performance does not predict future returns.**

Why us?

At Janus Henderson, we benefit from a combination of broad expertise across global securitised markets (US\$65 billion of AUM including US\$34.5 billion of CLOs, 12 experts), a market-leading active securitised ETF platform and long-established investment in European CLOs⁸.

Investment Team for CLOs

Experienced and stable global team driving competitive outcomes

 PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT																	
	John Kerschner, CFA Global Head of Securitised Products, Portfolio Manager 36 years experience	Denis Struc Portfolio Manager 21 years experience	Jessica Shill Portfolio Manager 9 years experience	Ian Bettney Portfolio Manager 26 years experience	Kareena Moledina Lead Client Portfolio Manager (EMEA) / Fixed Income ESG 17 years experience												
GLOBAL RESEARCH PLATFORMS	<table><tr><th>CORPORATE CREDIT</th><th>SECURITISED</th><th>EMERGING MARKETS DEBT</th><th>QUANTITATIVE</th></tr><tr><td>25 analysts 20 years average experience</td><td>13 analysts 14 years average experience</td><td>5 analysts 22 years average experience</td><td>22 professionals 13 years average experience</td></tr><tr><td>Mike Talaga, CFA Global Head of Credit Research</td><td>John Kerschner, CFA Global Head of Securitised Products, Portfolio Manager</td><td>Jacob Ellinge Nielsen Portfolio Manager</td><td>Erin Noel, CFA Global Head of Quantitative Fixed Income</td></tr></table>					CORPORATE CREDIT	SECURITISED	EMERGING MARKETS DEBT	QUANTITATIVE	25 analysts 20 years average experience	13 analysts 14 years average experience	5 analysts 22 years average experience	22 professionals 13 years average experience	Mike Talaga, CFA Global Head of Credit Research	John Kerschner, CFA Global Head of Securitised Products, Portfolio Manager	Jacob Ellinge Nielsen Portfolio Manager	Erin Noel, CFA Global Head of Quantitative Fixed Income
	CORPORATE CREDIT	SECURITISED	EMERGING MARKETS DEBT	QUANTITATIVE													
	25 analysts 20 years average experience	13 analysts 14 years average experience	5 analysts 22 years average experience	22 professionals 13 years average experience													
Mike Talaga, CFA Global Head of Credit Research	John Kerschner, CFA Global Head of Securitised Products, Portfolio Manager	Jacob Ellinge Nielsen Portfolio Manager	Erin Noel, CFA Global Head of Quantitative Fixed Income														
KEY INVESTMENT PARTNERS	<table><tr><th>FIXED INCOME TRADING</th><th>FIXED INCOME RISK MANAGEMENT</th><th>EQUITY CENTRAL RESEARCH</th><th>RESPONSIBILITY TEAM</th></tr><tr><td>20 traders 22 years average experience</td><td>7 analysts 16 years average experience</td><td>38 analysts 18 years average experience</td><td>32 professionals 10 years average experience</td></tr></table>					FIXED INCOME TRADING	FIXED INCOME RISK MANAGEMENT	EQUITY CENTRAL RESEARCH	RESPONSIBILITY TEAM	20 traders 22 years average experience	7 analysts 16 years average experience	38 analysts 18 years average experience	32 professionals 10 years average experience				
	FIXED INCOME TRADING	FIXED INCOME RISK MANAGEMENT	EQUITY CENTRAL RESEARCH	RESPONSIBILITY TEAM													
20 traders 22 years average experience	7 analysts 16 years average experience	38 analysts 18 years average experience	32 professionals 10 years average experience														

Source: Janus Henderson Investors, as of 1 January 2026.

Note: Research platforms include individuals who are considered both analysts and portfolio managers.

An established global CLO platform

US CLO ETF STRATEGIES

#1 AAA CLO ETF in the US by AuM

#1 CLO ETF provider in the US by trading volume

16 Authorised Participants

The **largest securitised active ETF manager** with **US\$27bn** of the US\$37bn CLO ETF assets

EUROPEAN ETF PLATFORM

16 Authorised Participants and **over 30** ETF trading counterparties

Listed on **all major European exchanges in multiple currencies**

30% of the AUM of the European CLO ETF market held by Janus Henderson



- ▶ Deep relationships in the global CLO ecosystem
- ▶ Established trading counterparties in the US and Europe
- ▶ US\$34.5bn of CLOs managed globally

Source: Janus Henderson Investors as at 31 December 2025. Global ETF Platform data and Global CLO AuM, as at 30 September 2025. Note: There is no assurance that the investment process will consistently lead to successful investing.

⁸ Source: Janus Henderson Investors, as of 31 December 2025, unless otherwise noted. AuM is as at 30 September 2025.

FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE VISIT JANUSHENDERSON.COM

Janus Henderson
— INVESTORS —

Important information

The views presented are as of the date published. They are for information purposes only and should not be used or construed as investment, legal or tax advice or as an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security, investment strategy or market sector. Nothing in this material shall be deemed to be a direct or indirect provision of investment management services specific to any client requirements. Opinions and examples are meant as an illustration of broader themes, are not an indication of trading intent, are subject to change and may not reflect the views of others in the organization. It is not intended to indicate or imply that any illustration/example mentioned is now or was ever held in any portfolio. No forecasts can be guaranteed and there is no guarantee that the information supplied is complete or timely, nor are there any warranties with regard to the results obtained from its use. Janus Henderson Investors is the source of data unless otherwise indicated, and has reasonable belief to rely on information and data sourced from third parties. **Past performance does not predict future returns. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value.** Not all products or services are available in all jurisdictions. This material or information contained in it may be restricted by law, may not be reproduced or referred to without express written permission or used in any jurisdiction or circumstance in which its use would be unlawful. Janus Henderson is not responsible for any unlawful distribution of this material to any third parties, in whole or in part. The contents of this material have not been approved or endorsed by any regulatory agency. Janus Henderson Investors is the name under which investment products and services are provided by the entities identified in the following jurisdictions: (a) **Europe** by Janus Henderson Investors International Limited (reg. no. 3594615), Janus Henderson Investors UK Limited (reg. no. 906355), Janus Henderson Fund Management UK Limited (reg. no. 2678531), Tabula Investment Management Limited (reg. no. 11286661), (each registered in England and Wales at 201 Bishopsgate, London EC2M 3AE and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority) and Janus Henderson Investors Europe S.A. (reg. no. B22848 at 78, Avenue de la Liberté, L-1930 Luxembourg, Luxembourg and regulated by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier); (b) the **U.S.** by SEC registered investment advisers that are subsidiaries of Janus Henderson Group plc; (c) **Canada** through Janus Henderson Investors US LLC only to institutional investors in certain jurisdictions; (d) **Singapore** by Janus Henderson Investors (Singapore) Limited (Co. registration no. 199700782N). This advertisement or publication has not been reviewed by Monetary Authority of Singapore; (e) **Hong Kong** by Janus Henderson Investors Hong Kong Limited. This material has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong; (f) **South Korea** by Janus Henderson Investors (Singapore) Limited only to Qualified Professional Investors (as defined in the Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act and its sub-regulations); (g) **Japan** by Janus Henderson Investors (Japan) Limited, regulated by Financial Services Agency and registered as a Financial Instruments Firm conducting Investment Management Business, Investment Advisory and Agency Business and Type II Financial Instruments Business; (h) **Australia and New Zealand** by Janus Henderson Investors (Australia) Limited (ABN 47 124 279 518) and its related bodies corporate including Janus Henderson Investors (Australia) Institutional Funds Management Limited (ABN 16 165 119 531, AFSL 444266) and Janus Henderson Investors (Australia) Funds Management Limited (ABN 43 164 177 244, AFSL 444268); (i) the **Middle East** by Janus Henderson Investors International Limited, regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority as a Representative Office. This document relates to a financial product which is not subject to any form of regulation or approval by the Dubai Financial Services Authority ("DFSA"). The DFSA has no responsibility for reviewing or verifying any prospectus or other documents in connection with this financial product. Accordingly, the DFSA has not approved this document or any other associated documents nor taken any steps to verify the information set out in this document, and has no responsibility for it. The financial product to which this document relates may be illiquid and/or subject to restrictions on its resale. Prospective purchasers should conduct their own due diligence on the financial product. If you do not understand the contents of this document you should consult an authorised financial adviser. No transactions will be concluded in the Middle East and any enquiries should be made to Janus Henderson. We may record telephone calls for our mutual protection, to improve customer service and for regulatory record keeping purposes.

Outside of the U.S.: For use only by institutional, professional, qualified and sophisticated investors, qualified distributors, wholesale investors and wholesale clients as defined by the applicable jurisdiction. Not for public viewing or distribution. Marketing Communication.

Janus Henderson® and any other trademarks used herein are trademarks of Janus Henderson Group plc or one of its subsidiaries. © Janus Henderson Group plc.